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Abstract 
As a management problem the identification of stakeholders is not easily solved. 
It comprises a modelling and a normative issue, which need to be solved in 
connection with each other. In stakeholder literature knowledge can be found, e.g. on 
various stakeholder categorizations, that could be useful for the modelling issue. 
However, the normative issue remains unresolved. Furthermore, the modelling of the 
so-called stakeholder category “the affected” is even more difficult. Nevertheless, this 
group holds justified interests in aspects of organizational activity and are, for that 
reason, legitimate stakeholders. In this article it is explored to what extent Critical 
Systems Heuristics can help resolving the managerial problem of identifying 
stakeholders, particularly the affected. Critical Systems Heuristics can be viewed a 
modelling methodology. The normative aspect of modelling is crucial in this 
methodology. Using the distinction between “the involved” and “the affected” a 
variety of boundary judgments is discussed. Special attention is given to the so-called 
“witness” as a representative of the affected.  
  1
1 Introduction 
Organizations that consider a strategy of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
have to address the question “to whom are we responsible?”  “To stakeholders” is the 
common answer to this question, which means that, for managing a CSR strategy, the 
identification of stakeholders is crucial. To a certain extent, management of CSR has 
become stakeholder management (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  
As a management problem the stakeholder identification is not easily solved: it 
comprises, at least, a modelling and a normative issue. The modelling issue refers to 
questions like: “Who are our stakeholders?” or  “To what extent is it possible to draw 
the line between stakeholders and non-stakeholders?” 
The normative issue refers to the managerial implications. Relevant questions 
are: “What stakeholders do we take into account?” or “To what stakeholders are we 
willing to listen?” Presumably, this category of stakeholders has the capacity to 
influence managerial and/or organizational behaviour. 
Looking at CSR literature, in a continuing “stakeholder debate”, these two issues 
are mingled (cf. Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Much has been written about the 
conceptualization of the stakeholder notion (see e.g. Freeman, 1984; Wood, 1991; 
Clarkson, 1995, Mitchell et al., 1997; Agle et al., 1999; Carroll, 1999) that could help 
resolving the modelling issue. However, it is insufficient for the normative issue. 
Although the question “What stakeholders deserve management attention” has been 
asked (Mitchell et al., 1997; Agle et al., 1999), it is interpreted in descriptive terms: 
“What stakeholders get management attention for what reason?” 
For identifying stakeholders, in the end, the normative issue needs to be 
resolved. However this cannot be done without addressing the modelling issue as 
well. Before further specifying the main question for this paper, some clarifying notes 
need to be made concerning the context of CSR and the term normative.  
CSR is defined as, “the obligations or duties of an organization to a specific 
system of stakeholders”. Defining the CSR-concept a number of considerations has 
played a role, which clarify the normative perspective as well.   2
Firstly, responsibility is described as “having a duty, an obligation”. In this 
sense, following Takala and Pallab (2000: 111), responsibility designates something 
still to be done as part of an established role-system. The aspect of time is important 
here. An organization is not only responsible for past performances
1, the notion of 
accountability is relevant then, but it has also a duty in relation to future actions. 
Secondly, a stakeholder is commonly seen as an individual or a group (e.g. 
Freeman, 1984).  However, it must be emphasized that there are relationships 
between stakeholders.  For example, coalitions of stakeholders are likely to have 
more influence than a stakeholder alone. Mitchell et al. (1997) describe how 
dependent Alaskan citizens became, in their terms, definitive stakeholders of Exxon 
by acquiring a powerful ally in government. Therefore, from a managerial 
perspective, it is important to consider also the systemic attributes of stakeholders and 
refer to a system of stakeholders. Furthermore, stakeholders are not objective entities. 
Using systemic terms emphasizes the need of modelling activities in stakeholder 
management. 
Thirdly, the organization is treated here as an entity which is responsible for its 
activities. Although this is usual in the literature on CSR and business ethics (Takala 
and Pallab, 2000: 112), it has to be acknowledged that this perspective is only 
possible when human activity is involved (Wempe, 1998). In this paper CSR is dealt 
with from a managerial perspective, which means, for instance, that corporate 
responsibility leads to managerial responsibility. 
Finally, stressing that a system of stakeholders has to be modelled involves 
already an element of choice. Asking the question “To what stakeholders are we 
willing to listen?”, further underlines the element of managerial choice. In the end the 
implication of a stakeholder perspective is a normative one: managers should 
acknowledge the validity of diverse stakeholder interest and should attempt to 
respond (cf. Donaldson and Preston, 1995: 87).  
 
In this paper the problem of stakeholder identification will be handled from the 
perspective of Critical Systems Heuristics (CSH), which has been developed by 
Werner Ulrich (1983, 1988). CSH is a system approach, which offers a variety of  3
boundary judgments. Leaving a more detailed explanation for the following sections, 
the essence of these boundary judgments is that they need to be made in a normative 
way, which is considered important in the context of corporate social responsibility. 
This leads to the following question for this paper: To what extent can Critical 
Systems Heuristics help resolving the managerial problem of identifying 
stakeholders?  
 
The argument in the paper has been structured along the following line. Firstly, 
the stakeholder “debate” in the CSR literature will be discussed in terms of its 
consequences for the choice of stakeholders. Secondly, the identification of 
stakeholders will be discussed as a modelling problem. For that purpose a few system 
concepts will be explained. Thirdly, on the basis of this, the line of argument takes a 
step to critical systems heuristics. Using the distinction between “the involved” and 
“the affected” the argument goes forward to a number of boundary judgements for 
modelling a system of stakeholders. 
The paper concludes with a review of critical system heuristics as an 
identification instrument for stakeholders in the context of corporate and social 
responsibility.  4
2  The Stakeholder Debate in CSR Literature 
This section gives a limited discussion on the stakeholder concept in CSR 
literature. The main purpose is to specify some consequences and/or problems with 
regard to the managerial choice of stakeholders.  
If we can speak of a “stakeholder debate” in CSR literature at all, it is revealed 
through two related questions. The first question is “What are the responsibilities of 
an organization?” and the second question is “To whom is the organization 
responsible?” 
Dealing with the first question leads to the normative content of CSR literature. 
Responding to, and contradicting with Friedman’s (1997/1970) statement that the 
social responsibility of business is to increase its profits, has played a crucial role in 
the normative development of the CSR concept (see e.g. Ackerman and Bauer, 1976; 
Goodpaster, 1998/1991; Carroll, 1999). The main conclusion is, using a variety of 
argumentations (see e.g. Freeman, 1994), that there must be attributed more than 
economic responsibilities to organizations, such as economic, legal, ethical and 
discretionary (or philanthropic) responsibilities (Carroll, 1995). In short, stockholder 
dominance is widely seen as untenable, although, as will be shown subsequently, not 
by everyone un-problematically (e.g. Goodpaster, 1998/1991). Anyhow, given a 
variety of organizational responsibilities, the second question “To whom are we 
responsible?” is self-evident. 
This leads, directly, to the stakeholder perspective on organizations. “The 
organization is responsible to its stakeholders” is the common answer to that question. 
A straightforward way of dealing with the stakeholder identification problem is to 
make a list of all the key actors in and around an organization. This may lead to a host 
of parties: stockholders and other creditors, consumers, suppliers, governments, 
employees, management, trade unions, social communities etc. etc. This list 
demonstrates the difficulties of such an undertaking. When is the list complete? What 
makes a party a key actor? Is it possible or relevant to categorize the various parties in  5
terms of their role or function for the organization? Various ways of defining the 
stakeholder concept result in diverse answers. 
Freeman (1984: 46) gives a very broad definition: “a stakeholder in an 
organization is (by definition) any group or individual who can affect or is affected by 
the achievement of the organization’s objectives” which could complete the list of 
stakeholders. This definition is widely acknowledged because of its “landmark” (cf. 
Wood, 1991; Clarkson, 1995) position in stakeholder theory. It has been numerously 
cited, however, usually as a starting point to give a more narrow view on 
stakeholders, in which categorizations, different from the distinction between “can 
affect” and “affected”, are described. 
 
These categorizations are thoroughly analyzed by Mitchell et al. (1997). They 
argue that the more narrow views attempt to define groups of stakeholders in terms of 
their direct relevance to the organization’s core interests or their necessity for its 
survival. Clarkson (1995), for instance, makes a distinction between primary and 
secondary stakeholders. “A primary stakeholder group is one without whose 
continuing participation the corporation cannot survive as a going concern” (p. 106). 
The existence of the organization is at stake in relation to the primary stakeholders. 
Accordingly, Clarkson points out that a corporation itself can be viewed as a system 
of primary stakeholder groups. He defines secondary stakeholder groups as “those 
who influence or affect, or are influenced or affected by, the corporation but they are 
not engaged in transactions with the organization and are not essential for its 
survival” (p. 107). 
Elsewhere, Clarkson (in Mitchell et al., 1997) stresses the importance of risk. 
Without the element of risk there is no stake. A stake is, in this sense, something that 
can be lost. Consequently, a stakeholder is a risk-bearer. From this viewpoint the 
distinction is made between voluntary and in-voluntary stakeholders. “Voluntary 
stakeholders bear some form of risk as a result of having invested some form of 
capital, human or financial, something of value, in the firm. In-voluntary stakeholders 
are placed at risk as a result of a firm’s activities” (Mitchell et al., 1997). Donaldson 
and Preston (1995: 67) describe a stakeholder as a group or person with legitimate  6
interests in procedural and/or substantive aspects of corporate activity. A stakeholder 
gains a particular benefit in the organization’s successful operation. This means that 
they describe the notion of a stake as a potential benefit. Donaldson and Preston point 
out that it is essential to draw a clear line between influencers and stakeholders. On 
the one hand there are stakeholders without influence (e.g. job applicants) and on the 
other hand, some influencers (e.g. media) have no stakes (p. 86). 
 
Although stockholder dominance is seen as untenable, to some extent the 
position of the stockholder is still a point of discussion. Does the stockholder or 
shareowner have a special status among stakeholders? In the so-called “Principles of 
Stakeholder Management”
2, the notion of risk has been used to point out that, 
although shareowners may have a special status, it is not because of higher risks. On 
the contrary, the risks of e.g. employees or customers may be higher. Shareowners 
deserve their special position, according to this statement, because of the fact that 
they have agreed “that their potential gain or loss from their involvement with the 
corporation is determined as a residual: it depends upon what is left over after all 
other stakeholder claimants have received their specified distributions”. 
Goodpaster (1998/1991) stresses the special status of the stockholder as well. He 
states that, because of the property rights, the stockholder has a “fiduciary” 
relationship with the corporation. Management fulfills a fiduciary  duty to the 
stockholder, in which trust is crucial. This means that management has the duty to 
keep the profit-maximizing promise. In other words, Goodpaster makes a distinction 
between fiduciary and non-fiduciary stakeholders. He poses the question whether a 
multi-fiduciary stakeholder orientation would be desirable? In other words, could 
there be “fiduciary” or trust-like relationships with other stakeholders as well? 
Goodpaster rejects this multi-fiduciary position because management will then 
be caught in what he sees as a stakeholder paradox: “Management must face 
resistance from those who believe that a strategic orientation (i.e. stockholder 
dominance) is the only legitimate one for business to adopt” (p. 113). The paradox 
lies in the fact that “there is an ethical problem whichever approach management 
takes”. Preferably, management should not bear additional fiduciary relationships to  7
third parties (i.e. non-stockholder stakeholders), but acknowledge moral obligations 
directly. Of course there are obligations to other parties. These obligations are moral 
obligations owed by organizations to those whose freedom and well-being is affected 
by their activities. These obligations are not instrumental, contingent or indirect, but 
direct or “categorical” (p. 117). Although Goodpaster is a representative of a more 
narrow view on stakeholders, he considers attention for the category “affected” 
inevitable. This means that his analysis of the managerial implications is consistent 
with a more broad view. 
According to Mitchell et al. (1997) this broad view is based on “the empirical 
reality that companies can indeed be vitally affected by, or can vitally affect, almost 
anyone” (p. 857). For stakeholder management there are two arguments for 
acknowledging this empirical reality, i.e. 1) an instrumental argument and 2) a social 
responsibility or ethical argument. The instrumental argument means that managers 
want to know as many stakeholders as possible, for firm-centered purposes, such as 
economic prosperity, damage control or even image building. It is advisable to 
include the affected, because this group can potentially affect the organization’s 
achievements. 
Secondly, the social responsibility or ethical argument corresponds with 
Goodpaster’s normative position that organizations owe moral obligations to those 
whose freedom and well-being is affected by their activities. Whichever position is 
taken, both perspectives require extensive knowledge about actual or potential 
stakeholders of the organization. 
 
How do managers deal with this complex problem? In other words, how do they 
choose their stakeholders and prioritize between competing stakeholder claims? 
Mitchell et al. (1997) and, in a follow-up article, Agle et al. (1999) try to answer this 
question by developing the “stakeholder salience” model. Stakeholder salience is 
defined as “the degree to which manager give priority to competing stakeholders 
claims” (Mitchell et al, 1997: 854). Their claim is that stakeholder salience is 
positively related to three key stakeholder attributes, i.e. power, legitimacy and 
urgency, which management believes to be present.  8
Without discussing the model and the three attributes in detail, their line of 
reasoning can be summarized as follows. Managers perceive a variety of stakeholder 
groups. They give a high priority to a stakeholder (-group), if they believe that this 
stakeholder has a legitimate claim, which calls for immediate action (i.e. urgent), and 
possesses the power to influence organization’s activities. This stakeholder, who is 
believed to possess all three attributes, is called a definitive stakeholder (category 7 in 
figure 1). Likewise, a classification of seven stakeholder groups is developed, 
depending on the presence of one, two or three attributes in varying combinations 















1. Dormant  Stakeholder 
2. Discretionary  Stakeholder 
3. Demanding  Stakeholder 
4. Dominant  Stakeholder 
5. Dangerous  Stakeholder 
6. Dependent  Stakeholder 
7.  Definitive Stakeholder 
 
 
Figure 1: Qualitative classes of stakeholders (cf. Mitchell et al, 1997: 872 ff.) 
 
Within the context of this paper, the discretionary stakeholder is especially 
interesting. Discretionary stakeholders possess the attribute of legitimacy, but have no 
urgent claim and no power to influence the organization. From managerial standpoint, 
there is no pressure to engage an active relationship with this stakeholder. This 
depends on the managerial choice to do so (cf. Mitchell et al, 1997: 875).   
It goes beyond the scope of this article to discuss this in more detail. What 
matters here is that they have developed a model, which explains why managers give 
attention to what stakeholders and how they prioritize competing claims. 
 
At this point, the stakeholder debate will be summarized by means of two 
conclusions. Firstly, various categorizations of stakeholders can be found in literature.  9
Especially the study of Mitchell et al (1997) has contributed to the analysis of these 
categorizations. In the introduction of this paper it has been stated that the problem of 
stakeholder identification comprises a modelling and a normative issue. The 
modelling activity, which will be further explained in the next sections, is about 
projecting categories on the real world. Therefore, this knowledge about 
categorizations could be used with regard to the problem of stakeholder modelling. 
Leaving aside the question “To what extent are these categorizations adequate for 
modelling purposes?” it cannot resolve the normative issue. Once more referring to 
the salience model, this study may explain why managers give attention to what 
stakeholders. However, to what extent these management decisions are justifiable 
from a normative standpoint, is another matter.  
Secondly, although the distinction between “affected” and “can affect” may 
widely be seen as insufficient for stakeholder identification, it is an important one, 
especially in the context of corporate social responsibility. With respect to this, I 
follow Goodpaster (1998/1991) that organizations owe obligations to those whose 
freedom and well-being is affected by their activities. In other words, this group 
possesses, in terms of Donaldson and Preston (1995), justified interests in aspects of 
organizational activity and are, for that reason, legitimate stakeholders. 
Acknowledging this, however, further complicates the stakeholder identification 
problem. This leads to questions such as “To what extent and in what way is it 
possible to identify the affected? and “How far does the inclusion of – potentially – 
affected stakeholders have to go”? 
With these conclusions and the resulting questions in mind, we move on to 
Critical Systems Heuristics.  10
3  Some Principles of Critical Systems Heuristics 
The ideas of Critical Systems Heuristics (Ulrich, 1983; 1988; Flood and Jackson, 
1991) have been used here to explore to what extent CSH can help resolving the 
stakeholder identification problem, especially with regard to the category of the 
affected. For this purpose, this section and the following one explain some principles 
and concepts from CSH. Evidently, this will lead to a limited discussion of CSH
3. 
CSH belongs to the tradition of systems theory. However, as it will be explained 
below, it occupies a special position in this tradition. There are many system 
approaches such as soft systems methodology, system dynamics or conceptual 
systems approach etc. Every approach has its own characteristics (see e.g. Flood and 
Jackson, 1991; Leeuw and Volberda, 1996), but they share a strong tradition in 
methodologies for modelling and designing systems. These methodologies use a 
variety of central concepts, i.e. system, element, boundary, environment. Basically, a 
system consists of a number of elements and the relationships between those 
elements. Whenever a systems perspective is applied decisions must be made that 
define the system concerned. It is important to note that these decisions are 
determined by the standpoint or purposes of the researcher or designer.  
The most fundamental modelling decision bounds the system from its 
environment. With regard to the stakeholder issue, this could be rephrased in 
bounding the system of stakeholders (note the definition of CSR given in the 
introduction) from the environment of non-stakeholders.  
To a certain extent Ulrich’s ideas can be viewed as a modelling methodology and 
as such it rightly belongs to the systems tradition. Ulrich develops a number of so-
called boundary judgements by critically reflecting on systems theory in general, and 
more specifically, on modelling activity. He advocates a so-called critically normative 
systems approach (Ulrich, 1988). What matters here is that the modelling – or in his 
terms the mapping – activity is acknowledged as a normative activity which is in need 
of critical reflection.  The map of a system is adequate when it makes its normative  11
content explicit. Before dealing with Ulrich’s boundary judgments in more detail in 
the next paragraph, some principles and general notions of CSH must be explained. 
 
There are four closely intertwined principles that guide the practice of CSH 
(Flood and Jackson, 1991: 202), i.e. the idea of “human intentionality”, the “systems 
idea”, the “moral idea” and the “guarantor idea”. In making plans for social reality, 
the “planner” (i.e. the designer) has to deal with human intentions and purposes. Plans 
– or proposals for design – have a meaning for individuals. For that reason, social 
systems have to be designed to become purposeful. A purposeful system is able to 
produce knowledge that is relevant to purposes and is able to encourage debate about 
purposes. In general, according to Flood and Jackson (1991), CSH is about the design 
and assessment of purposeful systems. With regard to this, it is important that it is not 
only about “how to do things”, but that it helps us to decide what we “ought to do” in 
order to improve reality. 
The systems, the moral and the guarantor idea are three “quasi-transcendental” 
ideas, which are based on the philosophy of Kant and that should be used as critical 
standards in the process of making plans for social reality. Basically, with the systems 
idea stresses Ulrich in a philosophical way what is common in every system 
approach. A system is a model (of a part) of social reality, which is always a limited 
projection of that part of social reality. With the systems idea Ulrich emphasizes the 
necessity to consider this “lack of comprehensiveness”.  
Through the moral idea Ulrich stresses that the planner should aim to improve 
human conditions by means of his/her plans. This means that the planner must be 
aware of the moral implications of the plan. As will be explained in the following 
section, referring to the so-called “involved” and “affected” of the social system, 
reveals this awareness of the planner. 
The meaning of the guarantor idea is that, although there is no guarantee that 
planning leads to improvement, the planner should seek to incorporate as many 
sources of guarantee as possible. This leads to seeking opinions by the planner from 
as many experts and stakeholder groups as possible (Flood and Jackson, 1991: 204).  12
In the following section these experts and stakeholder groups are interpreted in 
terms of the involved and affected in connection with the necessary boundary 
judgements.  13
4  Modelling a System of Stakeholders: the Involved and the Affected 
The main conclusion so far is that the planner, during his designing activities 
must refer to a variety of groups. At this point it is relevant to return to stakeholder 
management in the organizational practice of corporate social responsibility. After 
that, we will proceed with the modelling of the involved and affected as specifications 
of stakeholder groups. 
In the previous section it is explained that the planner fulfils the role of a 
designer in order to improve social reality. This means that the notion of planning 
must be interpreted very broadly; planning is understood as social systems design. 
The concepts of “planning” and “planner”, as used by Ulrich, are used here in terms 
of “stakeholder management” and “stakeholder manager”. 
According to Ulrich (p. 24), planning is, or should be, a public activity if the 
group of involved planners is not identical with the affected citizens. This position is 
very interesting within the context of stakeholder management.  Extending this 
position to this organizational practice, stakeholder management should be a public 
activity if the group of involved beneficiaries of organizational activities is not 
identical with the affected non-beneficiaries.  
 
Ulrich explains the boundary judgements by specifying the various groups of 
social actors to whom the planner must refer. With regard to the notions of social 
actor and planner some remarks must be made. 
The term social actor is interpreted here as a stakeholder. Actor refers to a social 
role rather than individuals. This means that these roles have to be specified in a 
concrete case in order to decide what individuals or groups of individuals are 
representatives of what roles. The “planner” must be seen as a social role as well. As 
said previously, in relation to stakeholder management he fulfils the role of 
stakeholder manager. Furthermore, in order to guarantee the normative content of the 
modelling practice, the various roles ànd their concerns in relation to the social 
system have to be specified.  14
Ulrich (p. 248) acknowledges two reasons anyone can claim belonging to the 
system, (a) because he is actually or potentially affected by the outcome of the 
system, and (b) because he has some kind of resources (expertise, political or 
financial, etc.) to contribute to the system, i.e. because he is involved. This leads to 
the two basic boundary judgments. The first judgment bounds the total system of the 
involved and the affected from the environment, that is from the environment of non-
stakeholders. The second one makes the distinction between the involved and the 
affected.  The term affected is restricted to the group who is affected, but not 
involved. This means that those individuals or groups who are involved ànd affected 
are considered belonging to the group of the involved. 
Let us consider the two basic groups in more detail and begin with the involved. 
On the basis of three sources of influence Ulrich divides the involved in three sub-
groups.  
1.  Sources of motivation: whose purposes (values, interests) are being 
(ought to be) served? This leads to the group “client”. 
2.  Sources of control: who has (ought to have) the power to decide? This 
leads to the group “decision maker”. 
3.  Sources of expertise: who has (ought to have) the necessary expertise? 
This leads to the group “planner”. 
Three notes are relevant. First, concepts or categories such as “involved”, 
“affected” or “planner” are projected on aspects of the real world. After all, that is 
what modelling is about. We decide to call a certain group with certain characteristics 
“client” or “planner”. What may be confusing here is that the application of CSH is 
not limited to the practice of organizational design or change etc., but can also be 
used for practices such as policy development or community planning. In 
organization theory the terms client or planner usually have a more restricted 
meaning.  
Second, every group can be considered a prototypical role and comprises in a 
specific case of a variety of individuals, who may belong to more than one group. 
Third, every question, of which the answer leads to a boundary judgement, 
should not only be phrased in the “is”-mode, but also in the “ought”-mode. In this  15
way, according to Flood and Jackson (1991), the normative content of the system 
design is best seen. 
 
The second basic group, the affected, is more difficult to specify. This group 
does not have a well-defined contribution, but they endure the unwanted side effects 
or pay some costs that are not endured by those who benefit from the system. As 
noted before, especially concerning the affected the problem of identifying 
stakeholders gets through. Potentially, this group is very large and it is not clear 
where the boundaries of this group lie. 
According to Ulrich (p. 251) the affected groups can rarely be bounded, because 
knowledge about the potential side effects and long-term risks is usually insufficient 
(see e.g. the recent discussions about the unknown effects of changing the biological 
genes of our food). Because of this identification problem, Ulrich concludes that “the 
affected” can only be bounded by means of a representation. It is crucial that not the 
involved, i.e. the planner, but the affected themselves will determine who is to 
represent them.  
At this point, the question rises whether we have made any progress resolving 
the problem of identifying this type of stakeholder? Indeed, as we look at the 
definition of Freeman of a stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect or 
is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives”, there is a striking 
similarity with the definition of the involved (i.e. can affect) and the affected (i.e. is 
affected). The group of the affected can also be seen as Clarkson’s in-voluntary risk-
bearers. 
What makes Ulrich’s (1983: 252) distinction noteworthy is that he comes up 
with a role that will argue the case of the affected; the essence of this role is that of a 
witness. Ulrich states: “…Rather than pretending that we can adequately grasp such 
issues by means of a detailed list of heuristically necessary categories, I suggest that 
we limit the claim for heuristic necessity to the one essential category of the 
“witness”… the planner cannot adequately trace the normative content of alternative 
boundary judgements … without referring to some social actors playing the role of 
witness…”   16
So far we have four categories of social actors that comprise the system of 
stakeholders and should have an input in the organization concerned. The client, the 
decision maker, and the planner are directly involved in the outcome of the 
organization. The witness represents the affected, which means that he becomes - 
indirectly - involved. 
In order to find the boundaries of the system and, more importantly, to reveal 
what the boundaries ought to be, there are three questions for every group that explore 
their sources of influence. The first and basic question is rather simple; it refers to the 
social role of the group. Who is the client, or who ought to be the client of the 
system? Likewise, similar questions are posed for the other groups. 
The following two questions are group specific and fulfill an auxiliary function 
in order to further determinate the groups. They refer to “role specific concerns” (i.e. 
the a questions) or to the key problems with regard to the determination of that group 







1.  Who is “Client”? (sources of motivation) 
a. What  is  purpose? 
b.  What is measure of success? 
2.  Who is “Decision Maker”? (sources of control) 
a.  What are decision components (aspects under control)? 
b.  What is decision environment (aspects not under control)?  
3.  Who is “Planner” (sources of expertise)? 
a.  Who is considered an expert and what is his role? 
b.  What is seen as guarantee for success? 
 
 
4.  Who is “Witness” (sources of legitimation)? 
a.  To what degree are the affected given the chance of
emancipation? 

























Figure 2: System of stakeholders (cf. Ulrich, 1983: 252 ff.)  17
  Although it is assumed that the complete set is useful for modelling and 
choosing stakeholders, this paper will not examine the complete set of questions in 
more detail (see Ulrich, 1983; Flood and Jackson, 1991). For reasons of space and 
because identifying “the affected” is most problematic, the remainder of this paper 
focuses on the so-called witness. 
 
While it is possible to describe the roles of the client, the decision maker and the 
planner in functionalistic terms, that is not the case for the witness. They do not 
contribute resources or expertise, nor do their goals motivate organizational activity. 
Ulrich reasons that the witnesses represent what he calls “the crucial source of 
legitimation” (1983: 256). By arguing the case of the affected toward the involved, 
they remind the involved of their moral responsibility for all the practical 
consequences of organizational activity. It is important that this responsibility goes 
beyond the effective functioning of the organization. 
Basically, the different concerns of the involved and the affected may be 
fundamentally conflicting. The essential point is, according to Ulrich, that the 
affected must be given the chance of emancipating themselves from being treated 
merely as means for purposes of others to “an end in themselves”. This is why Ulrich 
designates “emancipation” as the major concern for the witness. Accordingly, this 
leads to the key problem (i.e. question 4b in figure 2) for the determination of this 
group. Conflicting concerns may be rooted in different world-views 
(“weltanschauung”). In order to account for this fact, the different world-views of the 
involved and the affected must be traced. 
 
Who could be considered a witness, in what way do they fulfill their role and, 
perhaps more importantly, how do they become a witness? In general, one could think 
of action groups, pressure groups, and the media when, and solely in that case, they 
argue the case of affected with regard to a specific issue.  A short case study about a 
nuclear reactor will further exemplify the role of the witness. 
Very recently, the nuclear reactor at the Dutch town of Petten has been 
temporarily shut down for a review of safety procedures. Up to this closing down on  18
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th 2002, there was an interesting discussion to be seen between various 
stakeholders with conflicting interests. The plant at Petten is a so-called high flux 
reactor. The Joint Research Center as part of the European Commission, who is the 
owner, has set up this plant, for medical purposes. The permission to operate is issued 
by the Dutch Environment Minister and the “Nuclear Research and Consultancy 
Group” (NRG) operates the plant. The latter can be considered an operating company. 
It is worth mentioning that nuclear energy is a very sensitive issue in the 
Netherlands. Almost all nuclear power has been phased out and only one plant – at 
Borssele – is still in operation. Even though the reactor in Petten exists for medical 
purposes, there has also been a discussion about a possible closure of this reactor. In 
this discussion, several issues play a role, such as safety, what to do with nuclear 
waste, and the production of nuclear material for cancer research. 
In December 2001, “a whistle-blower” from within the NRG, made his concerns 
about the safety procedures public. Leaving aside the preceding and resulting 
problems in the working relationships, through the whistle-blower the events develop 
rapidly. An investigation of the Nuclear Physical Agency, a governmental 
supervisory body, points at hair-cracks and procedural irregularities. Whereas it is 
stressed that the reactor is completely safe, the environment minister Jan Pronk asks 
the owner of the facility to temporarily close it down. After some discussion between 
the Dutch minister, the European Commission and the NRG, the NRG complies with 
the urgent request to shut down the reactor. This seems to be, although temporarily, 
the end of story. 
However, immediately after the closing decision, health-care arguments gain 
importance. There are various press reports that quote cancer-specialists, about the 
negative consequences for cancer-patients. Because the reactor produces radio-
isotopes for European hospitals, closure could endanger the diagnosis and therapy of 
cancer-patients. After consulting the healthcare minister, the closure has been 
postponed for two weeks. 
 
This short illustration draws attention to some of the conflicting interests 
between stakeholders. It must be stressed that the case is far more complex than  19
described here; for reasons of space it is not possible to analyze the case more 
thoroughly. The category of the affected comprises at least two groups, depending 
from the issue that is under discussion. Firstly, from the perspective of the safety the 
“possibly affected” are Dutch or even European citizens. Although the whistle-blower 
belongs to the category of the involved, he can be viewed a witness for this type of 
affected as well. 
Secondly, from the perspective of healthcare, the affected are the cancer-patients, 
aware or not aware of their illness. In this matter various cancer experts and the media 
fulfill the role of the witness and cause some commotion about the possible negative 
effects of the closure. Eventually, the closure is reconsidered.  20
5 Conclusion 
This paper has focused on the question “To what extent can critical system 
heuristics (CSH) help resolving the managerial problem of identifying stakeholders?” 
It has been argued that this identification problem comprises a modelling and a 
normative issue. The practice of corporate social responsibility means responding to a 
variety of stakeholders with different interests and needs. Consequently, there are 
always decisions to be made among conflicting interests and needs. Although CSH is 
by no means -in terms of Ulrich- a guarantor for adequately dealing with those 
conflicting interests, it positively helps to become aware of them. Furthermore, by 
means of answering the boundary questions the system of stakeholders can be 
modelled and it helps to reflect on the implications of decisions made. Generally, it 
can be concluded that CSH has the potential to deal with the modelling and the 
normative issue concurrently. This conclusion as such makes it worthwhile to further 
explore the stakeholder identifying capabilities in the context of corporate social 
responsibility. 
Undoubtedly, empirical research should further explore and clarify the practical 
relevance of CSH for stakeholder identification in general, and for identification of 
the affected, more specifically. Although this paper has focused on the witness as a 
stakeholder category, it is assumed that the complete set of boundary judgments is 
helpful for identifying stakeholders, i.e. affected and involved. 
 
After these more general remarks, the following conclusions refer to the 
identification of the affected and to the witness as a representative of the affected. 
Firstly, the distinction between the involved and the affected is considered crucial, not 
only because the involved has the possibility to influence organizational behaviour 
and the affected does not have. The distinction is particularly important because of 
the modelling problems with regard to the affected. Acknowledging these problems 
along with the moral claim that an organization owes obligations to those whose 
freedom and well-being is affected, the notion of the witness possibly offers a way  21
out. It reduces the modelling problems, not in the least because the initiative lies with 
those who consider themselves affected. The witness stands up for the interests of a 
specific group, such as some medical experts did for the cancer patients in the “Petten 
case”. As also shown in this case, the affected is not a homogeneous group for an 
organization. It is likely this category comprises different groups with varying 
interests, depending on the decision(s) on the agenda. 
Secondly, the witness can be viewed a channel for the affected to influence the 
organization, which means that, to some extent, they become involved. However, 
there is another side of the picture. As said before, there are always decisions to be 
made among conflicting interests and needs. Sometimes it goes down to find a 
responsible balance between two evils. This is what Wempe (1998) calls the “dirty 
hands dilemma”. Finding a responsible balance makes detailed investigation into the 
nature of the dilemma necessary. The notion of a witness may offer a means to 
investigate the nature of various stakeholder claims.  
Thirdly, it appears relevant to differentiate between witnesses depending on the 
amount and nature of their influence. There is a difference between a witness who 
stands up for the interests of a specific group, and a witness who fulfills the role of a 
‘mediator’ between the organization and a group of affected. A witness mobilizes 
forces to influence the organization; a mediator tries to settle the differences. 
Finally, the main question is “When can an individual rightfully be considered a 
witness?” An individual is solely a witness when he or she represents a group or 
individual that is affected by the organization’s activities. It is the role of the witness 
to argue that their claim is justified. It must be emphasized that the reverse is not 
necessarily true. In other words, someone who witnesses, e.g. in the media, an 
organizational problem or failure is not necessarily affected by this event nor is a 
representative of the affected. This is why Ulrich stresses that it is only the affected 
themselves who can determine who is to represent them. Even so, a proactive attitude 
from the perspective of stakeholder management seems to be important. This leads to 
questions such as: In what way are witnesses determined? What kind of witness is 
available or adequate? Whom are they representing?   22
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1 This issue is related to the distinction that can be found in literature between ‘corporate 
social responsibility’ and ‘corporate social performance’ (See e.g. Wood, 1991; Clarkson, 
1995). 
2 These principles have been released on the internet, see: 
http://www.mgmt.utoronto.ca/~stake/Principles.htm  
3 For a more thorough discussion of Critical Systems Heuristics see Ulrich (1983; 1988) or, 
for a critical review of CSH, see Flood and Jackson (1991). 